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ABSTRACT In recent years, with the continuous development of significant data industrialization, 
trajectory data have more and more critical analytical value for urban construction and environmental 
monitoring. However, the trajectory contains a lot of personal privacy, and rashly publishing trajectory data 
set will cause serious privacy leakage risk. At present, the privacy protection of trajectory data mainly uses 
the methods of data anonymity and generalization, without considering the background knowledge of 
attackers and ignores the risk of adjacent location points may leak sensitive location points. In this paper, 
based on the above problems, combined with the location correlation of trajectory data, we proposed a 
plausible replacement method. Firstly, the correlation of trajectory points is proposed to classify the 
individual trajectories containing sensitive points. Then, according to the relevance of location points and 
the randomized response mechanism, a reasonable candidate set is selected to replace the sensitive points in 
the trajectory to satisfy the local differential privacy. Theoretical and experimental results show that the 
proposed method not only protects the sensitive information of individuals, but also does not affect the 
overall data distribution. 
INDEX TERMS correlation of points, local differential privacy, sensitive points, trajectory data
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, the increasing popularity of GPS-
enabled mobile devices, network communications and 
wearable sensors has greatly accelerated the development 
of location-based services (LBS) and e-commerce[1], 
resulting in massive amounts of trajectory data. These 
trajectory data refer to the set of temporal points that the 
user visits, and a series of Web pages that are browsed in 
chronological order. Using location trajectory data can help 
government agencies make more informed urban planning 
and avoid traffic jams, using web browsing records can be 
more customized to provide users with personalized 
services. However, these original trajectory data may 
include the user's personalized sensitive points, for example, 
the patient regards the hospital as a sensitive point, but the 
doctor may not. Privacy issues as studied in [25-28] really 
cause serious concern. To meet the personalized privacy 
needs of users, the trajectory data must be processed before 
release, and the sensitive points and related points should 
be hidden. 
A great deal of work has been done on how to conduct 
privacy protection while mining association rules [2,3] and 
frequent itemsets [4]. However, they can-not be applied to 
the personal trajectory data directly because the trajectory 
data are multiple location points in chronological order. 
Among them, works in [5,6] adopt a suppression approach 
by removing the individual sensitive item, e.g., locations or 
web pages. The authors of [7] adopt a generalization 
approach to replace fine-grained data with coarse-grained 
data. Works in [8] adopt a permutation approach which re-
arranges the ordering of items in each sensitive pattern in 
the released sequence. The drawback of suppression-based 
approaches is the data loss inflicted by deleting item in the 
released data, especially when sensitive patterns are 
frequent patterns. The generalization-based approaches can-
not handle with attackers with strong background 
knowledge. Combined with the context, the probability of 
speculating on a sensitive item may increase. The 
permutation-based approaches break the inherent ordering 
in the sequential data and create “ghost” patterns that do not 
exist in the original database. 
To the best of my knowledge, [9] is the article most 
similar to ours, and also protects sensitive points from 
opponents with strong background knowledge.Their 
method provides two privacy checks to decide whether to 
release or suppress the user's current location. The output is 
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limited to the user's current position or suppression symbol. 
In other words, for the output sequence 
321 LLL  , the attacker can see the sensitive 
point is between 2L and 3L . Combined with the context, the 
probability of speculating on sensitive item may increase. 
Inspired by [10], this paper proposes Lclean, which 
applies local differential privacy to the privacy protection 
of sensitive points in trajectory data, which makes it 
impossible for attackers to infer the sensitive information of 
users in the original trajectory data through the published 
trajectory data.We assume that users set sensitive point sets 
themselves, and Lclean obtains these sensitive points as 
inputs. However, the adjacent points may also leak 
sensitive points, sensitive points and these sequences which 
may lead to the leakage of sensitive information are called 
sensitive regions. Our goal is to prevent any formidable 
attacker from inferring the user's sensitive information 
without affecting the data distribution too much. In this 
paper, we propose to replace sensitive regions with non-
sensitive sequences. The replacement length depends on the 
correlation between sensitive points and their adjacent 
points. Our main contributions are as follows: 
(1) We propose to apply local differential privacy to 
protect sensitive points in individual trajectories without 
affecting the usability of the overall trajectory. 
(2) We propose a randomized response mechanism k-RI 
based on k-RR to replace the sensitive regions with other 
non-sensitive sequences, which do not restrict the attacker’s 
background knowledge. 
(3) We propose a novel notion,i.e., a correlation between 
sensitive points and their adjacent points. The strength of 
the correlation determines the replacement length, and if the 
correlation is strong, the strong correlation sequence need 
to be replaced. conversely, replace the sensitive point. 
In the remaining of the paper, Section 2 reviews recent 
related works, Section 3 convers some definitions and 
theorems. Section 4 contains our proposed solutions. 
Section 5 provides experimental results. Section 6 
concludes the paper and states future research directions.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
Most of the location privacy protection schemes tend to 
avoid cryptographic primitives. The main reason is the 
difficulty on key management [13-15] and computational 
overhead. At present, the release of trajectory data can be 
divided into two categories. The first category is designed to 
handle the release of a trajectory dataset containing a large 
number of trajectories, each of which can be thought of as a 
record. The second type, [11] [12], aims to publish a single 
trajectory, treating each point in the trajectory as a single 
record. The biggest difference between the two is that the 
first type is the entire trajectory of the protection, while the 
second one is the single location. Several papers (e.g., [29-
31]) have studied related privacy issues. In this article, we 
combine two approaches to publish a dataset that contains a 
large number of trajectories while protecting a user's single 
sensitive location. 
K-anonymity based on trajectory generalization has been 
prevailing for its good balance of privacy protection and data 
availability. In [16], a (k,δ)-anonymous algorithm was 
proposed for trajectory dataset publication. Based on 
trajectory generalization and k-anonymity, this algorithm 
generalized every position in the trajectory to a circle with a 
radius of δ, and Make sure that each circle has at least k 
points to satisfy k-anonymity, each of which is represented 
by a cylinder of these circles. In [17], a data suppression 
technique was proposed to limit the probability of 
speculation of sensitive locations by assuming the attacker's 
background knowledge. The literature [18] considered the 
scenario in which users' privacy attributes were distributed 
with trajectory data. A (K,C)L-privacy model was proposed, 
where L represents the longest sub-trajectory length assumed 
by an attacker. The model can resist the re-identification of 
track data attacks and attribute attacks. However, as 
mentioned above, all of the techniques above for privacy 
distribution based on k-anonymity trajectory data set need to 
assume the background of the attacker, and the quantitative 
comparison between the different models for privacy 
protection can-not be made. 
Differential privacy[19] was quickly applied in the privacy 
protection of data publishing based on fake data technology 
to achieve privacy protection by adding noise to the real data 
set. In data distribution, differential privacy can achieve 
different levels of privacy protection and data publishing 
accuracy by adjusting the privacy parameter ε. In general, the 
larger the value of ε, the lower the level of privacy protection 
and the higher the accuracy of the published dataset. The first 
common mechanism for implementing differential privacy is 
the Laplacian mechanism proposed in [20]. This mechanism 
mainly focuses on numeric queries. By adding random noise 
obeying Laplace distribution to the results of real queries. For 
non-numeric queries, [21] proposed an exponential 
mechanism, which is the second universal mechanism to 
achieve differential privacy. 
[9] has the same purpose as our paper and protects the 
sensitive points of individual users while ensuring the 
availability of the published trajectory dataset. They provide 
two privacy check methods to decide whether to release or 
suppress the user's current location. They limit the output to 
real or suppressed symbols. Unfortunately, it is possible to 
extrapolate sensitive location information based on the 
suppression of symbols combined with the attacker's strong 
background knowledge. 
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III. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, the symbols and related definitions used in 
this paper are given. Finally, formally defines the trajectory 
replacement problem. 
Location Trajectory. A Location Trajectory is the 
sequence of successive spatiotemporal points produced by a 
particular user for a period, and it is presented as : 
 nu loclocloclocT ,...,,, 321  
where iloc represents the Points of Interest(POI). In the real 
trajectory dataset, every POI corresponds to a timestamp. In 
this paper, the timestamp is not taken into account when 
locating the sensitive region. However, when determining 
the candidate set, whether the replacement point meets the 
region reachability is judged by combining the timestamp.  
Correlation of location points. Consider iloc as a 
sensitive point, if it is known that the previous location or 
next location can increase the probability of the attackers 
guess, presented as: 
 
We call it a strong correlation sequence, where  tlocP is the 
probability of the attackers’ random guess with the context 
presented as:   Nlocc t /,5.0max , where  tlocc is the 
number of users who have been to tloc and N is the total 
number of users.  1| tt loclocP is the probability of the 
attackers’ infer with the previous location 1tloc presented as:
   11 /,  ttt loccloclocc , where  tt loclocc ,1 is the 
occurrences of tt locloc 1 , and  1tlocc is the 
occurrences of point 1tloc . 
ε-local differential privacy. Consider a setting where 
there are n records; a randomized algorithm M is  -local 
differential privacy if and only if any two input t and 
  MDomttt ',' , and for any possible anonymized output 
 MRangeO : 
     OtMeOtM  'PrPr   
where the probability is taken over the randomness of M . 
Randomized response. Randomized response technology 
[22] is the mainstream perturbation mechanism of local 
differential privacy. According to Kairouz et al., A gradient 
response technique, k-RR [23], is proposed to overcome the 
problem that the randomized response technique is directed 
to binary variables. For the case that there are k(k>2) 
candidate variables can also directly use randomized 
response. k-RR requires consistent input and output range.In 
this paper, In this paper, k-RI is proposed to satisfy the 
outputs contained in the inputs. The random response 
algorithm shows the output of different inputs as follows: 
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So we adjust the randomized response mechanism to: 
 
If the input R does not belong to the output set, then an 
output is selected randomly from the output set; otherwise, 
the probability response to the real result is   eke 1/ , 
and any of the other 1k results is  ek 1/1  to satisfy 
the local differential privacy. 
Utility loss. The published trajectory data should be 
consistent with the original data distribution as much as 
possible, and the utility loss is defined below, which is also 
the most important evaluations in this experiment. 
KL-divergence: For each sensitive region j to be replaced,
 nxxxX ,...,, 21 is the candidate set. ploc is the previous 
location of the sensitive region which is called parent node, 
rloc is the next location of a sensitive region which is called 
root node. For any jSXx  , the occurrence probability of 
rp locxloc  in original trajectory data is  xPj , and 
transformed into  xQ j in the published trajectory. We define 
the kl-divergence of each sensitive region j as follows: 
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Trajectory similarity[24]: Assuming that  immmA ,...,, 21  
represents the original trajectory,  innnB ,...,, 21 represents 
the processed trajectory, and the trajectory similarity between 
A and B is as follows: 
     
 BADiff
BADiffBADiff
BATrajSim
,max
,min,max
,


 
Where  BADiff ,min and  BADiff ,max are the minimum 
distance and the maximum distance between A and B.  
IV. OUR PROPOSAL 
In this section, we present the design of the proposed 
plausible approach for individual trajectory Sanitization. The 
overview framework is shown in Figure 4-1, that implements 
the end-to-end system from original trajectories and sensitive 
set to privacy-preserving trajectories. The original trajectory 
and individual sensitive points are used as the input of the 
whole substitution mechanism, and the sensitive points are 
located to determine the set of sensitive regions to be 
replaced. The output of the previous step is used as the input 
to determine the candidate set. The randomized response 
makes the algorithm satisfy ε local differential privacy.  
 
FIGURE 1. Framework of Lclean substitution mechanism 
A. DETERMINE SENSITIVE REGIONS  
In this subsection, we present the algorithm to perform the 
determine sensitive regions for original trajectory data. First, 
we get the sensitive point index to extract the sequence 
containing the sensitive point. Secondly, we determine the 
correlation between the sensitive points and the adjacent 
points. If the correlation  is strong, The strong correlation 
sequence should be replaced, on the contrary, just replace the 
sensitive point . Determine sensitive region algorithm (DSR) 
is described as follows: 
Algorithm 4.1 LSA  
Input：original trajectory datasets D , the sensitive set of u 
Su 
Output：set of sensitive area SS(including sensitive area 
and the former location and the latter location) 
1.For each uSs do 
2.   Find the former of s and the latter of  s represented by x0 
and x1 respectively; 
3.   Determine the relationship between s and x0, s and x1 
according to Section 2; 
4.   If(Strong correlation) 
5.       Add the Strong correlation sequence to SS. 
6.   Else 
7.       Add the s to SS; 
8.Return SS 
Assuming that the attacker has strong background 
knowledge, he can do the query in the entire dataset. 
According to the definition in section 2, sensitive regions are 
obtained by calculating the correlation between each 
sensitive point and its adjacent points(lines 3-7).  
B. DETERMINE CANDIDATE SET 
The output from the previous subsection along with the 
original trajectory data are used as input to this subsection. 
Non-sensitive regions of the same parent and child nodes as 
the sensitive region are found as candidate set by sub-
sequence matching. This subsection considers the timestamp 
when determining whether a candidate set, that is to 
determine whether a candidate meets the spatiotemporal 
accessibility is judged by combining 
the timestamp. 
 
 
where is the maximum speed of a human. If the length 
of the sensitive region is n, the length of candidate sequence 
is no more than n. Determine candidate set algorithm(DCS) 
is described as follows: 
 
Algorithm 4.2 DCS  
Input：original trajectory dataset D,set of sensitive area SS 
Output：The candidate set CS 
1.For each SSss : 
2.   Find alternate sequences do not contain sensitive 
information ; 
3.      Find alternate sequences do not have strong 
correlation;  
4.         Determine whether the alternate sequences satisfied 
the spatiotemporal accessibility; 
5.         If(satisfied) 
6.             Add the alternate sequence to CS; 
7.Return CS 
The candidate set should satisfy three rules:  
(1) have the same parent node and child node as the sensitive 
region(line 2);  
(2) each candidate is weakly connected to the parent node 
and child node (line 3);  
(3) A candidate value should satisfy the spatio-temporal 
accessibility with the parent and child nodes(line 4). 
 

 ba tt
badis ,
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C. PRIVACY REPLACEMENT MECHANISM 
Now we get the candidate set for each sensitive region, the 
algorithm in this subsection applies the randomized response 
mechanism k-RI, which makes it impossible for the attacker 
to predict sensitive region with the replaced trajectory 
accurately. That is to say; our algorithm meets ε-local 
differential privacy. Above all, we assume that all k 
candidate sets are diverse from each other. For the candidate 
set containing duplicate values, the results also meet ε-local 
differential privacy. The privacy replacement algorithm 
(PRA) is described as follows: 
Algorithm 4.3 PRA   
Input：original trajectory dataset D,The candidate set CS, ε 
Output：noisy trajectory dataset Dr 
1. CS/  ; 
2.For each uj SS   
3.For each ji CSseq  : 
4.Algorithm A determine the relationship between iseq and 
the former location and the correlation between iseq and 
the latter location. 
5.If(weak correlation) 
6. jCSK  , find a ji CSseq  as the input,according to the 
formula 4-1,the possibility of output iseq is   eke 1/ , 
and the possibility of picking one randomly from the rest is 
 ek 1/1 . 
7. Replace the sensitive area with the output. 
8.Return Dr 
This subsection implements the substitution work for each 
sensitive region. First, we divide the privacy budget. The 
candidate set: 
}},...,,,}...{,...,,,{{ 2121 mjni seqseqseqSSseqseqseqSSCS 
The size of CS is the number of sensitive regions to be 
replaced. Therefore, the privacy budget for each sensitive 
region is CS/ to ensure that the entire trajectory meets ε-
local differential privacy. This equal division of the privacy 
budget is called the average privacy replacement(BR). Each 
candidate is evaluated for correlation before replacement to 
ensure that it is weakly correlation after the 
replacement(line3-5). Line6 implements local differential 
privacy replacement, and the output of randomly response 
mechanism is used as the final replacement value.  
D. PROPORTIONAL PRIVACY REPLACEMENT 
In the previous subsection, to guarantee the local differential 
privacy of the entire trajectory, we first assign an average 
privacy budget when replacing each sensitive region. In this 
section we give a ratio-based allocation of the privacy 
budget(RatioR). 
 
 
 
Where |CSj| is the candidate set size for the j sensitive 
region. In the real trajectory, the size of candidate set for each 
sensitive region to be replaced varies from region to region. 
In this section, the region to be replaced with fewer 
candidates is allocated smaller privacy budget to ensure a 
stronger degree of privacy protection and more privacy 
budget for larger candidates. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To simulate the location trajectory anonymization we have 
used the Gowalla check-in dataset. This dataset was collected 
by almost 200000 users, and it contains 650000 trajectories. 
To verify the utility of our method, we first define a baseline 
method [8] in which the sensitive points (sequences) are 
published in the form of. The utility loss function defined in 
Section 3 is taken as our experimental evaluation target: KL-
divergence. We compare our average privacy replacement 
(BR) and the ratio-based privacy replacement (RatioR) with 
the baseline method under different privacy budgets. 
A. KL-DIVERGENCE 
Based on the KL-divergence metric in Section 3, the error 
between the replaced trajectory data and the original 
trajectory data is quantified. In this paper, we replace and add 
noise to multiple sensitive regions, the practicality measure 
in this subsection is evaluated separately for each sensitive 
region. For any sensitive region to be replaced, the candidate 
set is CSj, the probability of outputting any one of the 
candidate set is: 
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We adjust the KL-divergence formula to: 
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Where  lip loccloccount  represents the number of 
occurrences of lip loccloc  in the trajectory dataset, 
 lp locloccount * represents the number of locations 
that the previous location is ploc and the next location is
lloc  . Figure 5-1 shows the utility loss compared with the 
privacy replacement method BR and RatioR. 
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(1)ε=0.1                             (2) ε=0.3 
 
  
(3) ε=0.5                          (4) ε=0.7  
FIGURE 2. Utility loss comparison 
The abscissa is the number of the sensitive region to be 
replaced, and the ordinate is the utility loss of DKL. It can be 
seen from the figure that the loss of utility of our average 
privacy replacement method (BR) and the ratio-based 
privacy replacement method (RatioR) is lower than that of 
the baseline method. For the point of 3 and 10, the utility loss 
is slightly higher than the baseline method. This is a result of 
having a too small candidate set, which will lead to a great 
fluctuation with a certain value changes. Also, we can see 
from the experiment that RatioR increases the degree of 
protection for each sensitive region and thus reduces its 
practicability, the possible loss DKLj increases slightly. 
The utility loss of the entire trajectory is shown in Figure 
5-2 below: 
                                                                     
(a)                                      (b) 
FIGURE 3. Utility loss of the whole trajectory 
As shown in the figure, the abscissa is the value of the 
privacy budget. It can be seen from Figure a that as the 
privacy budget increases, the practicality of the overall 
trajectory data increases slightly. From Figure b, we can see 
that the utility loss of our two methods is significantly lower 
than the baseline method. The experimental results show that 
our average privacy replacement method (BR) and the ratio-
based privacy replacement method (RatioR) meet ε-local 
differential privacy while maintaining better practicality. 
B. TRAJECTORY SIMILARITY 
Based on the trajectory similarity metric in Section 3, the 
similarity between the replaced trajectory data and the 
original trajectory data is quantified. We change the privacy 
parameter ε and conduct multiple experiments to get the 
average. Figure 5-3 shows the trajectory similarity results 
with the privacy replacement method BR and RatioR. 
 
FIGURE 4. Trajectory similarity under different ε 
As shown in the figure, the abscissa is the value of the 
privacy budget. It can be seen that as the privacy budget 
increases, the similarity value increases. We can see that 
when ε increases from 0.1 to 0.3, the trajectory similarity 
increases greatly, but there was no significant change from 
0.3 to 0.7. The experimental results show that the released 
trajectory under ratio-based privacy replacement method 
(RatioR) is more similar to the original trajectory. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We presented Lclean, a system that uses substitution as a 
mechanism to protect sensitive points of an individual. 
Instead of random substitution of sensitive regions, which 
can degrade the utility of the overall datasets, we perform a 
privacy substitution mechanism with a randomized response. 
We employ an average privacy substitution and a ratio-based 
privacy substitution to meet the ε-local differential privacy 
while maintaining the consistency of release trajectory. 
Through experimentation on real-life check-in trajectory 
datasets, we demonstrated that our two privacy substitution 
strategies could indeed be used for preserving the utility of 
processed data while achieving ε-local differential privacy. In 
future, we have the plan to work on multi-user trajectory 
privacy protection, considering the connection between 
different users’ sensitive points and make it difficult to figure 
out person sensitive information. 
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